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The Court’s Opinion on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on
Human Rights may have shattered expectations. Who had thought that the revised
accession agreement that was renegotiated by the EU and its Member States with
the State Parties to the ECHR, after an initial rejection in the Council by the UK and
France, would be dodged by the Court? After all, on all the points that the Court
and its President had made known to the negotiators, namely the guaranteed ‘prior
involvement’, the Court seemed to have been granted a privileged position, that
has not been granted to any other court of any of the parties to the ECHR. Was
the Court’s membership of the Council Committee in charge of supervising the
negotiations on this and other points in vain?
It is too early to give an in-depth assessment of the position taken by the Court on
various points. We do now know that we have to take the President seriously when
he announced in the plenary debate at the closing session of the FIDE Conference
2014 powerfully:
The Court is not a human rights court: it is the Supreme Court of the Union.
So, what is next? Tobias Lock in his very fast and intelligent comment answered that
question by stating that ‘[i]t is clear that the drafters of the DAA will have to return to
the negotiating table’. I respectfully disagree.
Whether one finds the Court’s rejection and its concept of autonomy a form of
autarky or a symptom of autism, and whether or not its judges behave like Humpty
Dumpty, spoilt brats, or overly severe schoolmasters dealing out a bad marks to the
Commission, the reality is that there is little political prospect that the non-EU parties
to the ECHR will be willing to reopen the negotiations on accession, and give up
all the compromises that in the end they were willing to strike. I refer in particular to
Switzerland, Turkey and the Russian Federation. The declaration of Russia at the
re-opening of the negotiations after a few EU Member States rejected the earlier
version of the Accession Agreement, stands as an omen (see Appendix VI to the
Minutes of the relevant meeting).
So if renegotiating the Accession Agreement is hardly feasible, the other alternative
that the TFEU leaves open, is to amend the EU Treaties. It is this option that I here
consider.
The points on which the Court rejected the Accession Agreement are numerous, and
some of them concern points that are not in the Treaty at all, in particular the issue
of ‘autonomy’ of the Court. It is also for these – but not only – that the solution here
proposed would be a way out.
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Seeking inspiration in clauses of national constitutions of some of the Member States
that provide a constitutional way out of constitutional divergences for the sake of
further European integration, I propose solving the matter with a “Notwithstanding
Protocol”.
It should read:
‘The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, notwithstanding Article 6(2)
Treaty on European Union, Protocol (No 8) relating to Article 6(2) of the
Treaty on European Union and Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18
December 2014.’
In this manner the Treaties have been amended fully in accordance with the
requirements of the Court as well as Article 218 (11) of the TFEU. All of the several
objections of the Court are covered by such a Protocol. Should there arise any
doubts on this, the proposed provision can be accompanied by either a consideration
in the Preamble or another protocol provision, that reads:
‘This Protocol effects a revision of the Treaties in the sense of Article
218(11) of the Treaty on European Union.’
True, not all 28 Member States took the same position before the Court on whether
accession agreed with the Treaties. Nevertheless, at least of 24 we can assume that
they disagree with the Court’s eventual Opinion. It will be easier to straighten out
and negotiate a Notwithstanding Protocol with four (partly) dissenting EU Member
State than having to go through highly embarrassing negotiations with the parties
to the ECHR plus the Council of Europe (and European Court of Human Rights
representatives).
There is of course a constitutional presumption underlying such a Notwithstanding
Protocol.
The rejection of the first draft Accession Agreement had cast doubt on the sincerity
of some of the Member States to take their commitment to let the EU accede to
the ECHR seriously. The Court of Justice has now driven its recent position of not
accepting any EU legal commitment that anchors it within a broader legal order to
the very extreme on the issue of the protection of fundamental rights of EU citizens
within the strictly European context.
Thus, the Court casts doubt on its constitutionalist commitment to the project
of European integration. It is now for the EU Member States to show what the
protection of the rights of their citizens is worth to them, and whether they think
it useful to anchor it externally and consent to protection according to the pan-
European minimum standard by a European Court that has so successfully provided
a true safety valve, should the EU institutions fail to do so.
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